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Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later:
What Makes for Greatness in a Legal Opinion?
Neil G. Williams*

I. INTRODUCTION

Each entering class at Loyola University Chicago School of Law is
required to take an intensive week-long introductory course that is
called "Fundamentals of the American Legal System." Professor Henry
Rose and I are in charge of the session entitled "The Role of Lawyers in
Society." The purpose of this session is to focus beginning students on
the positive impact that resourceful, committed lawyers can have on the
greater society. To illustrate this point, Professor Rose and I have the
students read Plessy v. FergusonI and Brown v. Board of Education2 in
tandem. In Plessy, decided in 1896, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection was not violated
by a Louisiana statute that required railroad companies to maintain
"separate-but-equal" accommodations for blacks and whites. 3
In
support of what came to be known as the "separate-but-equal" doctrine,
the Plessy Court noted that the very Congress that had approved the
Fourteenth Amendment had itself required segregation of the races in
the District of Columbia public schools. 4 In Brown, some six decades
later and some fifty years ago, the Supreme Court reversed course by
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. B.A., Duke
University, 1978; J.D., The University of Chicago Law School, 1982. I would like to thank
Sreeram Natarajan, Michael Ouderkirk, and Lorraine Buerger for their wonderful research
assistance. A debt of gratitude is also owed my wife, Elaine, my mother, Florence, and my
mother-in-law, Eurleyne Levison, for inspiring and supporting everything I do. Additional kudos
also are due the staff of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for inviting me to participate
in the Race in Education Policy Conference and contribute to this special volume.
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-52.
4. Id. at 544-45 (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (1850)). "It was held [in
Roberts v. City of Boston] that the powers of the committee extended to the establishment of
Similar laws have been
separate schools for children of different ages, sexes and colors ....
enacted by Congress under its general power of legislation over the District of Columbia ...
Id. at 544-45.
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holding that state-sanctioned racial segregation of public schools
violated the equal-protection principle. In the words of the Court: "We
conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." 5
Before I discuss Brown with the first-year students, we show them
the upbeat documentary, The Road to Brown,6 which praises the Brown
decision to the high heavens in the course of laying well-deserved
accolades at the feet of the hearty corps of NAACP Legal Defense Fund
Lawyers (Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, in
particular) who so ably argued Brown.7 In the course of lecturing our
first-year students about Brown and the judicial process, I add to the
stream of encomia flowing from the documentary by invoking Norman
Amaker's 8 imagery of Brown setting off "a chain reaction in society
equivalent to that of nuclear fission." 9 This explosion, I go on to say,
ended in the absolute obliteration of the shanties of American apartheid
that defiled the legal landscape of this country for far too long. Next I
quote the following observation by Theodore Shaw, a lawyer currently
with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund: "For African-Americans,
[Brown] divides American history into a B.C. and an A.D. ' 1°
Indeed, for many (including me) Brown has become an honest-togoodness "American icon."'" This is not to say, however, that over the

5. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
6. THE ROAD To BROWN: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE MAN WHO KILLED JIM CROW
(California Newsreel 1990).
7. See id. (chronicling the history of Jim Crow laws and praising how Charles Hamilton
Houston utilized his legal education to institute social justice and to train Thurgood Marshall and
the NAACP to "kill Jim Crow"). For a book that masterfully details the work done by Charles
Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and the other attorneys whose labors culminated in the
Brown case, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
8. Norman C. Amaker was a legend in the Civil Rights Movement who graced the classrooms
of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law for almost twenty-five years. For tributes to
Professor Amaker, see Drew Days III, A Tribute to Norman Amaker, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 539
(2002), and Neil G. Williams, Remarks Upon Accepting the FirstNorman C. Amaker Award of
Excellence on January24, 2002, id. at 537.
9. Norman C. Amaker, Life, History and the Constitution in the Strugglefor Racial Equality,
in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 11 (A.L.I./A.B.A.
Committee on Continuing Professional Education, June 1988).
10. Quoted in Adam Cohen, The Supreme Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 4A-24.
11. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does it Matter What the Court Said in Brown?,
81 TEX. L. REV. 305, 305 (2002) (book review) (citing book editor's view that Brown has
"achieved... [an] iconic status"); Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Multiple Ironies: Brown at 50, 47 HOW.
L.J. 29, 29-30 (2003) (noting Brown as a "beloved legal and political icon").
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12
years the Brown decision has been free of controversies and criticism,
although I must admit that for purposes of my introductory session I
steer away from those controversies and criticisms of Brown. After all,
one of the goals of the session is to get neophyte law students in a
positive frame of mind regarding the study and practice of law.
Therefore, I now welcome the opportunity to delve into some of these
purported shortcomings of Brown. For the sake of organization, I will
first discuss those criticisms of Brown that are leveled most directly at
the opinion itself and its reasoning.1 3 I will establish a framework for
discussing criticisms of the case by means of a brief overview of the
briefly discuss the perceived
Court's reasoning in Brown. Then I will
14
legacy.
Brown's
shortcomings regarding
The Court assumed with regard to the four cases decided under the
Brown moniker' 5 that the black "schools involved have been equalized,
or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
16
qualifications, and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors."
Accordingly, were the Court to apply the Plessy "separate-but-equal"
analysis only to those tangible factors, the plaintiffs would have been
granted no relief. 17 In line with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's
carefully crafted strategy, Chief Justice Warren characterized the
question before the Court as follows: "Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical

12. See, e.g., Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in HistoricalContext: Social Science and
the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 803 n.40, 804 n.44 (2002)
(describing some of the political and jurisprudential criticisms of Brown); Sullivan, supra note
11, at 32-35 (discussing the problematic nature of the "vocabulary of black inferiority" in
Brown); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 32-34 (1959) (describing some of the arguments advanced by Brown's critics in the 1950s and
questioning whether "there is a basis in neutral principles" for the holding in Brown). See
generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 68 (2001) (summarizing some of the concerns
expressed by liberal and conservative critics of Brown).
13. See infra Part II (discussing criticisms that the Brown opinion rests on the assumption that
blacks are inherently inferior).
14. See infra Parts V and VI (addressing criticisms of the current education system as a result
of the two Brown opinions).
15. Briggs v. Elliott, 348 U.S. 210 (1954) (originating in the state of South Carolina), Davis v.
County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 348 U.S. 210 (1954) (originating in the state of
Virginia), and Gebhart v. Belton, 348 U.S. 886 (1954) (originating in the State of Delaware),
were consolidated with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (originating in the state of
Kansas). Furthermore, the same day it issued Brown, the Court decided Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), a case in which it invoked the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to outlaw
segregation in the District of Columbia school system.
16. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
17. See id. (stating that instead of focusing on tangible factors the Court "must look instead to
the effect of segregation itself on public education").
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facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"' 18 The Court
therefore felt the need to take into account intangible factors. " In the
course of this examination, the Court emphasized the importance of
education in modem society. 20 According to the Court:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 21
The intangible harm cited by the Court has been the focal point for
much of the criticism of the case. Using words destined for
controversy, 22 the Court went on to reason that state-sponsored
segregation harmed African-American children by generating in them
"a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
23
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
Chief Justice Warren then proceeded to quote findings from the
opinion of the three judges who felt then-existing law compelled them
to rule against the Brown plaintiffs when the case was heard by the
federal district court in Kansas, even though the judges had grave
24
misgivings about segregation's effect on black children:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect on the colored children. The impact is greater when
it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
18. Id.at 493.
19. Id. (citing McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)). In McLaurin, the
Court considered intangible factors such as a student's "ability to study, to engage indiscussions
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." Id.
20. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. Stating that:
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE,
CULTURE,AND THE CONSTITUTION 214 (2002) (describing controversy over Brown's use of
social science evidence of psychological harm to black school children); Sullivan, supra note 11,
at 32-38 (criticizing the "vocabulary of black inferiority" in Brown and Plessy).
23. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
24. The Brown case, originating in Kansas, was decided by a three-judge district court panel.
Id. at486 n.1.
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Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
(retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
25
racial[ly] integrated school system.

In distinguishing Plessy, the Supreme Court noted that "[w]hatever
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem
authority." 26 Chief Justice Warren supported the latter observation with
the famous (some might say infamous) footnote eleven. 27 The first
authority cited in footnote eleven was a study done by Kenneth and
Mamie Clark, two African-American psychologists. 28 In the study, the
Clarks showed Southern black children pictures of dolls of various
hues. 29 They would then ask the children questions such as which of
the dolls were "nice" or which of the dolls were "bad., 30 Most of the
25. Id. at 494 (parenthesis in original).
26. Id. It is after this sentence that footnote 11 is inserted. Id. Footnote 11 includes citations
to six social science studies generated in the years ranging from 1944-52 regarding how blacks
and children are negatively impacted by environmental factors such as segregation. See Mody,
supra note 12, at 802 n.33 (describing scope of six studies). Cf. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 354
(describing Clark expert testimony in Briggs v. Elliot (one of the Brown cases) in which Kenneth
Clark concludes that segregation had negative effects on both "victims of segregation" and on the
segregating group).
27. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.ll. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 214 (noting that
critics of the Court's use of controversial social science evidence in footnote II actually helped
the Court resolve an issue older than Plessy); KLUGER, supra note 7, at 706-07 (detailing how
Justice Warren "thought the point [footnote 11] made was the antithesis of what was said in
Plessy" but how the sources he listed "provoked at least mild concern among several members of
the Court" and how the need not to offend "seemed to make the inclusion of footnote #11
forceless and therefore gratuitously obnoxious"); Mody, supra note 12, at 801 (quoting
proposition that footnote II is perhaps "the most dispute-laden footnote in American
constitutional law").
28. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.ll (citing K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and
Discriminationon PersonalityDevelopment (Mid-century White House Conference on Children
and Youth 1950)); Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in
Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 602-11 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1958) (publishing formal article in which Clarks describe their research); KLUGER, supra
note 7, at 353-57 (describing Kenneth Clark's expert testimony in Briggs v. Elliot in which Clark
concludes that segregation had negative effects on both "victims of segregation" and on the
segregating group).
29. Clark & Clark, supra note 28, at 602. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 124-25
(summarizing Clark's study Segregation as a Factor on the Racial Identification of Negro PreSchool Children in which the black dolls were consistently chosen as the "bad" doll and the white
dolls as the "nice" dolls); KLUGER, supra note 7, at 353-57 (detailing the testimony of Kenneth
Clark during which he described the testing method of showing dolls to children, asking
questions, and then concluding that segregation had a detrimental effect on black children);
PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 43-45 (recounting the influence of Clark's studies among lawyers
and how Clark performed the same test, only with drawings instead of dolls, to verify his initial
findings before he testified at the district court case in Charleston).
30. Clark & Clark, supra note 28, at 602. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 43-44
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black children would choose pictures of white dolls in relation to
positive characteristics and pictures of black dolls in relation to negative
characteristics. 3 1 Based on these observations, Kenneth Clark reasoned
that the self-image of black children was being negatively impacted by
segregation in the South.3 2
II.

CRITICISMS OF THE BROWN I OPINION

Over the years many critics have faulted Brown for the Court's
33
apparent reliance on the Clark research in finding constitutional harm.
Some sociologists have questioned the methodology that the Clarks
used in their research.34 Since I am not a social scientist, I will not dare
venture to address those concerns. But I will deal with several of the
critiques of the legal methodology employed by the Court in Brown.
Not surprisingly, arch-segregationists quickly and eagerly seized the
(describing methodology used by the Clarks); KLUGER, supra note 7, at 354 (summarizing expert
testimony by Kenneth Clark in Briggs v. Elliott (one of the Brown cases) in which he described
his research).
31. Clark & Clark, supra note 28, at 608-11; see PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 43-44
(summarizing the results of Clark's research); COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 124-25
(describing Clark's research and findings); KLUGER, supra note 7, at 353-57 (summarizing
Kenneth Clark's findings and expert testimony in Briggs v. Elliott (one of the Brown cases in
which he described his research)).
32. See KLUGER, supra note 7, at 354 (quoting expert testimony by Kenneth Clark in Briggs
v. Elliott (one of the Brown cases) in which Clark cites consensus among social scientists "that
segregation definitely has negative effects on the personalities of those individuals who are
victims of segregation"). Clark goes on to say the following based on his research: "[T]he
conclusion which I was forced to reach was that these children in Clarendon County, like other
human beings who are subjected to an obviously inferior status in the society in which they live,
have been definitely harmed in the development of their personalities." Id. See also PATTERSON,
supra note 12, at 44 (also quoting language from Clark's testimony in Briggs v. Elliott to the
effect that segregated black school children had been "definitely harmed in the development of
their personalities"); CoTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 125 (observing Clark concluded his
studies were proof of "self-rejection, one of the negative effects of racism on children at the early
stages of their development").
33. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 44-45 (summarizing criticisms of Kenneth Clark's
findings and methodology); COTrROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 214 (describing concerns by some
that the Court's "reliance on social science evidence left the school desegregation decision on
shaky constitutional grounds, changeable with new social science data or methodologies");
KLUGER, supra note 7, at 356-57 (describing arguments that support proposition that Kenneth
Clark's "findings were, at the very least, highly ambiguous and open to sharply varying
interpretations"); Id. at 710 (quoting Alexander Bickel as saying "It was a mistake to do it in this
way. If you're going to invoke sociology and psychology, do it right. Invoking Kenneth Clark
was a mistake because of the vulnerability of the doll tests."); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 46
(arguing that the legal theory drove the social science conclusions in Clark's studies, as opposed
to the reverse).
34. See KLUGER, supra note 7, at 355-56 (describing criticisms of Clark research by
prominent social scientists); PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 44-45 (summarizing criticisms of
Clark research and methodology).
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opportunity to use the Clark studies as ammunition for attacking
Brown. 35 However, Herbert Wechsler, one of his generation's most
respected legal scholars, famously lamented that the Court had allowed
the freedom-of-association rights of whites to be trumped by something
36
other than what Professor Wechsler would deem a "neutral principle."
In response to Professor Wechsler's misgivings, I echo Norman
Amaker's observation that "never in our history as a people have any of
us, black or white, been 'neutral' on the matter of race. It has been, and
remains, the great overriding issue throughout all our history, in all our
' 37
law, in all our institutions."
Interestingly, some of the most vitriolic complaints have come from
within the black community. 38 This was the case even as the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund was making the decision to present the Clark
studies to courts hearing desegregation cases. 39 With regard to the use
of the Clark studies, the venerable William Coleman, then part of the
Legal Defense Fund team, is said to have exclaimed: "Jesus Christ.
Those damned dolls! I thought it was a joke."''4 Shortly after the
issuance of the Brown decision, the great writer Zora Neale Hurston
took offense at what she perceived to be Brown's assumption that black
institutions are inherently inferior. 4 1 She viewed the Brown decision
itself as stigmatizing and insulting to those who taught at and ran black
schools. 42 Commenting on the Missouri v. Jenkins43 litigation, Justice
35. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 69 (describing attacks on Brown's use of social science
research by "defenders of segregation"); Mody, supra note 12, at 803 n.40 (citing sources in
which segregation proponents argued against Brown's result in part because of Court's reliance
on social science evidence).
36. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 17, 32-34 (questioning whether the judgment "really turned
on the facts").
37. Norman C. Amaker, Remark: The Haunting Presence of the Opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 3, 6-7 (1995) (responding to commentator Herbert Wechsler's
critique of the Brown decision as lacking in neutrality).
38. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); Sullivan, supra note 7, passim;
COTrROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 44-45 (summarizing black critics' concerns that "[situdies
such as Clark's... aimed to demonstrate the nasty consequences of white racism in American
society but had the unintended effect of demeaning black people").
39. COTrROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 44 (noting that Jack Greenberg, Spottswood Robinson,
and William Coleman questioned Thurgood Marshall's decision to introduce the Clark research
into evidence).
40. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 44.
41. Id. at xxvi-xxvii (describing Hurston's views and quoting her concerns that "forcible
association" would undermine the "self-respect" of black people). An African-American who
wrote four novels and two books of folklore, Hurston is regarded as one of the pre-eminent
writers of the twentieth century. See http://authors.aalbc.com/zoraneal.htm (last visited Sept. 12,
2004) (summarizing Hurston's life and literary accomplishments).
42. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 44 (stating that Zora Neale Hurston expressed reservations
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Clarence Thomas followed in the Zora Neale Hurston tradition by
is inferior,
44
taking umbrage at the notion that "any school that is black
of whites."
company
the
without
succeed
and that blacks cannot
Justice Thomas went on to say, "[t]he theory that black students suffer
an unspecified psychological harm from segregation that retards their
mental and educational development ... not only relies upon
principle
questionable social science research rather than constitutional
4 5 In an article
but it also rests on an assumption of black inferiority.
recently published in the Howard Law Review, Ronald Sullivan
continues the broadside by black critics, arguing that "[any
benefits ... derived from the Brown holding must be measured against
its premises-the vocabulary of black inferiority. For all of Brown's
4 6 As far as Sullivan and the
victories, we are left to ask: at what cost?"
other black detractors of Brown are concerned, "the Court and the
[T]he Court could and should
litigants made the wrong choice ....
conclusion, without reliance on the vocabulary
have reached the same
47
of black inferiority.
To address Brown's perceived shortcomings, several prominent law
professors in recent years have undertaken to rewrite Brown the way
48
In 2001, for example,
they think it should have been written.
nine leading scholars
which
in
49
Professor Jack Balkin edited a book
Brown decision.
the
"rewriting"
of
engaged in the enterprise
Admittedly, Brown is by no means perfect. One of the great advantages
we exercise as academics is the freedom to imagine the world of law as
it should be, free of the bothersome limitations that judges and

the decision at the time it was rendered).
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 200-0 1.
Id. at 201.
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 49.
Id.
of the Loyola
48. In fact, an example of this type of undertaking appears in this issue
Opinion in
Hypothetical
The
Brown,
Kevin
University Chicago Law Journal. See generally
Education,
of
Board
v.
Brown
in
Taken
Not
Road
the
of
Perspective
the
from
Bollinger
Grutter v.
believed it should
36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 83, 91 (2004) (drafting an "opinion" of Brown the way he
have been written).

about
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

SAID: THE NATION'S TOP
49. WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
(Jack M. Balkin ed.,
DECISION
RIGHTS
CIVIL
LANDMARK
AMERICA'S
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE

the point of the
2001) [hereinafter WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID]. The editor states that
equality in our
to
commitment
constitutional
America's
of
meaning
the
exercise was "to rethink
theoretical
time." Id. at x. Later in the volume the editor goes on to observe "[tihe underlying
over
controversy
ongoing
the
of
because
later
years
fifty
important
is
justification of Brown
or antiwhether the underlying principle of constitutional equality is anti-classification
subordination." Id. at 55-56.
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practicing lawyers often have to confront in the real world. 50 Regarding
the various scholarly efforts to rewrite Brown, one wonders whether any
of these admittedly well-crafted, beautifully written opinions that (for
the most part) oh-so-assiduously avoid relying on theories of
psychological harm to black school children 5' would have garnered the
52
votes of all nine Justices in 1954 America.
By one head count, the Brown plaintiffs would have prevailed by a
bare majority (five to four) if the case had been decided immediately
after oral arguments first took place in December 1952. 5 3 Justice Felix
Frankfurter intuited that if there were any prayer that the Court's
decision would be obeyed in the South, then the decision needed to be
as close to unanimous as possible. 54 In order to buy time, Justice
Frankfurter convinced his colleagues to hear new sets of oral arguments
during the next term directed to the vexing question as to what the intent
of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment may have been regarding

50. See Amaker, supra note 37, at 13-14 (describing the "wide gulf between the real life
responsibility of a judge to write an opinion deciding momentous constitutional questions" and
"an opinion written in hindsight without such responsibility," but noting "this does not mean that
opinions that decide our most important constitutional questions are beyond criticism").
51. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 37-38 (praising efforts by academics to re-write Brown in
ways that avoid relying on psychic harm suffered by black school children); WHAT BROWN
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 49, at 52 (editor noting that "[m]any of the contributors to this
book eschew Warren's tack of relying on social science evidence" and that he chose to say
"nothing about these studies, relying instead on the history of Jim Crow as evidence that
segregation was a subordinating practice"). But see WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra
note 49 at 209 (explaining why John Hart Ely, in his rewrite of Brown, chose to retain Brown's
language regarding harm to the "hearts and minds" of black children in his version of the opinion,
but avoided relying on the sources in footnote 11 because they "either went entirely to a different
point ... or were methodologically unsound on their face"); id. at 147 (noting that Catherine
MacKinnon, in her rewrite of Brown, acknowledged that "injuries to equality typically do inflict,
inter alia, psychic harm" but argued that the "violation of law ... lies not in the children's
response to the state practice but in the practice itself").
52. See Amaker, supra note 37, at 3, 14 (emphasizing that the 1954 Court was composed of
"white males of diverse background and imperfect understanding" and noting the need for
"criticism [to] take into account the real world of the adversary process"); cf. WHAT BROWN
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 49, at 35 (describing Chief Justice Warren's goal of writing the
opinion in a way that not even one of his colleagues, particularly one from the South, would write
a dissent in the case).
53. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 163-65 (identifying the four likely dissenters as
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Jackson, and Clark and describing the different
considerations that probably would have spurred these Justices to vote against school
desegregation had Brown been decided in the 1952 term); PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 56
(speculating on the political and social pressures that would have affected the decision of the
Court had it chosen to act in 1952).
54. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 163 (explaining how anything less than a
unanimous vote would invite uncertainty, recrimination or rebellion from the segregationist
South).
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55
school segregation and the proper role of the courts in addressing it.
After all, as had been noted in Plessy, the very Congress that approved
the Fourteenth Amendment itself directed separation of black and white
56
children in the District of Columbia public school system.
Compounding the predicament of anyone who might want to predicate
the Brown decision on the views of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the reality that in nineteenth-century America
57
segregation was a common practice in many Northern school districts.
In September 1953, near the start of the Supreme Court's next term, an
event happened that Frankfurter is reputed to have said proved the
believe
existence of God: Chief Justice Fred Vinson, who scholars
58
away.
passed
plaintiffs,
Brown
the
would have voted against
Earl Warren, the former Governor of California and a former vice
59
presidential candidate, was named the new Chief Justice.
Fortuitously, Chief Justice Warren was a supporter of the Brown
plaintiffs, and he shared Justice Frankfurter's concerns that a less-thanunanimous decision would have a difficult time gaining public
acceptance. 60 However, drafting an opinion that would garner the votes
of all nine Justices was a daunting task.6 1 Upon entering the 1953-54
term, there were still three Justices apparently poised to vote against the
Brown plaintiffs.6 2 Among the three likely holdouts was Justice Stanley
Reed. 63 In the 1952-53 term, although Justice Reed, who resided with

55. See id. at 143-44, 166-67 (listing the five questions submitted for re-argument and
analyzing Justice Frankfurter's concerns with the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
school segregation).
56. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545; COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 147
(describing how John Davis emphasized the historical segregation of D.C. schools in his
arguments on behalf of the defendants). But see WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note
49, at 160-65 (discussing how Michael W. McConnell, in an opinion rewriting Brown, argued
that debates and votes on the Sumner-Butler bill show that the Reconstruction-era Congress
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to bar segregation).
57. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45; Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850)
(upholding racial segregation in the Boston public-school system); COTTROL ET AL., supra note
19, at 17-18 (describing how Roberts laid the foundation for Plessy some 46 years later).
58. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 145 (examining the impact of Chief Justice
Vinson's sudden death and the appointment of his successor, Earl Warren); PATTERSON, supra
note 12, at 57 (discussing the effect of Vinson's death on the outcome of the case).
59. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 59-60 (highlighting Warren's career and his
moderately liberal political background which many African-Americans found appealing).
60. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 174-75 (stating that if the decision would not be
unanimous, Chief Justice Warren at least hoped he might gain a consensus on remedy).
61. See id. at 175-76 (describing the uncertainty of the Justices' intentions to write either
concurring or dissenting opinions).
62. See id. at 163 (discussing the reasons Justices Reed, Jackson, and Clark would vote
against desegregation).
63. See id. at 163 (discussing Justice Reed's documented history of racial biases and his firm
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his wife at Washington's Mayflower Hotel, 64 joined his brethren in
unanimously upholding a statute that outlawed segregated restaurants in
Washington, D.C., 65 he is reported to have remarked: "Why-why, this
means that a nigra can walk into the restaurant at the Mayflower and sit
down to eat at the table right next to Mrs. Reed." 66 Given the range of
the Justices' views on matters of race, the Court's unanimity in Brown
verged on being a miracle.6 7 Brown stands as a monument to Justice
Frankfurter's sheer determination, 68 Chief Justice Warren's political
acumen, 69 and the willingness of all nine Justices to compromise 70 so
that the Court could speak with a unanimous voice in terms everyone
could understand. 7'
III.

BROWN: THE RIGHT DECISION FOR THE RIGHT REASONS

On balance, given the practical realities of the time, I believe that the
litigation strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, including its
presentation of the psychological studies, was a coup de maitre. I
attempt to illustrate this point to entering first-year students by likening
the efforts of the lawyers arguing Brown to those of the attorney in the
movie A Time to Kill. 72 In that movie, Carl Lee Hailey, an AfricanAmerican character played by Samuel L. Jackson, goes into a rage and
guns down two white men who brutally raped and tortured his ten-year-

belief that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to require school integration).
64. PATrERSON, supra note 12, at 55.
65. See D.C. v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953) (holding that where the federal
Constitution is involved, legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in use of
facilities serving a public function is within the state's police powers).
66. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 55.
67. See Amaker, supra note 37, at 3 (observing that the Brown Court was composed of "white
males of diverse background and imperfect understanding"); WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID,
supra note 49, at 35 (describing Warren's fear that a Southerner might write and dissent and
observing that "a unanimous opinion seemed like an impossible dream until Warren became
Chief Justice").
68. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 163-75 (detailing Justice Frankfurter's behind-thescenes efforts to procure unanimity in Brown).
69. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 60 (detailing how Chief Justice Warren went about
mending "a badly fractured Court"); COTrROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 176 (explaining how
Chief Justice Warren convinced Justice Reed to join the other Justices in making Brown
unanimous).
70. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 175-76 (detailing how Justice Jackson dropped
plans to issue a concurring opinion and how Justice Reed eventually decided to join the other
Justices in making Brown unanimous).
71. See KLUGER, supra note 7, at 699 (describing a memorandum in which Chief Justice
Warren told other Justices that the opinion "should be short, readable by the lay public, nonrhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory").
72. A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996).
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old daughter. 7 3 At the black defendant's instigation, his attorney turns
the tide in his client's favor by having the all-white jury visualize the
details of the circumstances surrounding the young girl's rape. In
74
closing, the attorney says to the jury: "Now imagine that she's white."
At that point, Carl Lee Hailey and his daughter cease in the eyes of the
jury to be mere abstractions; they cease to be, paraphrasing the title of
Ralph Ellison's masterpiece, Invisible Men, that is, outsiders subsisting
at the periphery of the white world. 75 Rather, as reflected in their
verdict, the people sitting on that jury now saw the Haileys as fellow
members of the broader human community who had suffered a wrong
with which they themselves could identify.76
Getting a court to take into account the human reality in which laws
are applied is the essence of good lawyering. Flawed though it may
have been, the evidence of psychological harm in Brown was
instrumental in getting nine white males, some of whom were
Southerners, steeped in the traditions, mores, and values of that region
at that peculiar time in our history, to identify with the human toll
exacted by school segregation. 77 This evidence may have caused the
Justices to think how they might have felt if the victims in Brown had
been their children or grandchildren.
Near the end of his life and his time on the Court, Justice Marshall no
doubt was aware of the mounting criticism of the litigation strategy he
In 1991, the Court decided Board of
had pursued in Brown. 78
Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,79 a case that set the stage for the
dissolution of desegregation decrees across the country when it could be
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. See RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1947) (chronicling the travels of the book's main
character, a young, nameless black man, as he experiences racial intolerance in America and
comes to the realization that he is invisible in that people choose to look through him, either
consciously or subconsciously).
76. See A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996) (reflecting the response of the jury when
persuaded to envision the crime as victimizing a person of their own race and noting responses of
emotional identification with the defendant); cf Note, Being Atticus Finch: The ProfessionalRole
of Empathy in To Kill a Mockingbird, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1697-98 (2004) (describing a
passage in To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) in which Atticus Finch sets "aside his 'arid
professional detachment' to appeal directly to the hearts and emotions of the jury").
77. Cf. supra notes 62-70 (describing Justice Reed's initial reluctance to vote for school
desegregation and how Chief Justice Warren eventually convinced him to join his brethren in
making Brown unanimous); KLUGER, supra note 7, at 711-12 (stating that his clerk recalls that
Justice Reed shed tears after Brown was read from the bench and that he considered Brown to be
the most important case decided while he sat on the Supreme Court).
78. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 201 (describing spectrum of black critics who in the I990s
publicly challenged Marshall's integrationist approach).
79. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).

2004]

Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later

shown that school districts had eliminated "vestiges" of prior acts of
intentional discrimination to the extent "practicable." 80 As it turned out,
Dowell was the last school desegregation case that Justice Marshall
would hear on the Court.8' Indeed, he must have realized that Dowell
would be his final opportunity to make an official pronouncement
concerning the efficacy of his life's work. Justice Marshall seized the
occasion to fire a salvo at Brown's critics by filing a dissent in which he
brazenly quoted the passage from Brown that cited the psychological
harm segregated schools caused black children. 82 To the bitter end,
Justice Marshall believed, in Norman Amaker's words, that Brown was
83
"decided right and for the right reasons."
IV. BROWN PLUS FIFry:
A PERSONAL REFLECTION ON GROWING UP IN THE JIM CROW SOUTH
On a personal note, and perhaps at the risk of appearing
anachronistic, I would like to share my own feelings about Brown's
assertion that the psyches of black school children were imprinted with
a sense of inferiority as a consequence of state-sponsored segregation. I
was a black child who grew up in the South during the segregation era,
albeit (fortunately) at a point in time when old Jim Crow was drawing
his last breaths. Until I was six years old, we stayed with my
grandmother in Gainesville, Florida. I can remember "white only" and
"colored only" signs. Indeed, one of my earliest childhood memories is
drinking particularly nasty tasting water from a "colored" water
fountain in Jacksonville, Florida. I remember thinking to myself
whether the water would have been as pungent if I had been allowed to
drink from the white fountain. Subsequently, after my family moved to
Atlanta, I remember the anger that swept over my mother and father,
both proud professionals, and the humiliation I felt, when on a trip
between Gainesville and Atlanta, a road-side restaurant refused to serve
my family. Even in 1960s Atlanta I remember suffering the indignity of
black people having to enter public buildings from side entrances and
being forced to sit in specially cordoned-off balcony seats. I attended
all-black public elementary schools in Atlanta, and I still remember
often having to use books, which from their markings, clearly were
hand-me-downs from white elementary schools. In 1969, as a direct

80. Id. at 249-50.
81. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 198 (stating that "Marshall's dissent was his last
opinion in a school case").
82. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 252, 257-59 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
83. Amaker, supra note 37, at 5.
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consequence of the Brown decision, I was afforded the opportunity to
attend Grady High School, one of the premier predominantly white high
schools in the Atlanta Public School System. Under a desegregation
order, students who would be a member of the race that was in the
majority at their neighborhood high school were given the option of
transferring to a school in which their race would be in the minority. To
be honest (and I am aware that this is not fashionable), although I
certainly looked forward to the opportunity, I was scared at the prospect
of attending Grady. I remember that some in my own community told
me that although I was considered "smart" in an all-black setting there
was no way I could compete with the "smart" white kids at Grady.
Even if I had not been told this, the world of segregation that
surrounded me had already caused me to internalize this sentiment. In
this regard, Brown and its footnote eleven capture my life experience
with chilling accuracy. I entered Grady High School questioning my
academic ability. When I graduated valedictorian several years later, I
was finally liberated from this nagging self-doubt spawned by my early
childhood confrontations with Jim Crow segregation.
Whatever its methodological faults may have been, the Clarks'84
psychological research rings true to my personal life experiences.
However, I do not believe that by admitting that the state-sanctioned
apartheid of my youth caused me to have doubts about myself and my
abilities that I am somehow giving aid and succor to the notion of
"black inferiority." 85 I feel that honestly and openly grappling with
these feelings of self-doubt is an affirmation of my humanity, not my
inferiority. Accordingly, by accepting the NAACP team's invitation to
acknowledge the psychological harm suffered by many black school
children in the South, the Court was not saying African-Americans are
in fact inferior. Rather, in my mind, the Court was seeing the children
as full-fledged human beings who succumbed (as many people of flesh
and blood predictably would) to the messages the system was intended
86
to convey.
84. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (describing criticisms of Clark research's
methodology). By no means am I claiming, to use Ronald Sullivan's words, that segregated
schools are "inevitably the cause of irreparable psychic harm to black children." Sullivan, supra
note 11, at 46. I'm sure that some of my contemporaries in segregated schools in the South were
able to "resist feelings of inferiority." Id. at 39. My perception, however, is that my response to
the segregation surrounding me was not uncommon among those I knew growing up.
85. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 49 (faulting the Court and the NAACP litigation team for
using the "vocabulary of black inferiority").
86. See WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 49, at 147. The book quotes
Catherine MacKinnon in her rewrite of Brown, who stated:
[Wihat the children were found to have thought and felt was simply what the practice,
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V.

AFTERMATH OF BROWN I AND BROWN II:
OF RESEGREGATION AND DISAPPOINTMENT

A TALE

Some skeptics contend that Brown would have been better decided if
the Court had focused more on the illegitimacy of the external practices
involved and less on what went on inside the minds of black school
children. 87 Quite arguably, this is precisely what the Court proceeded to
do in subsequent equal-protection cases. 88 With regard to claims of
state-sanctioned discrimination, the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence shifted away from a focus on stigmatic injuries to victims
to a focus on the perspectives of school boards and other State
officials. 89 As Professor Linda Greene points out, this perpetrator
perspective provided the framework for what many regard as a retreat
from the spirit of Brown by insisting that courts can only stay involved
in school desegregation cases when segregation and inequities are
9
proven to be the results of intentional acts of discrimination. 0
Arguably, one of Justice Marshall's purposes in filing his last schoolcase dissent in the Dowell case was to highlight the consequences of
shifting from a focus on the victims' injuries to the perspectives of State
officials. 9 1 In effect, Justice Marshall was taking the position that there
would not have been an argument for dissolving the Oklahoma City
decree if the Court had continued to focus, as it had in Brown, on the
harm done to black children when their schools remained racially

in social reality, meant: they were assumed inferior, their presence contaminating, to
white children. The children's response is also one measure of what that practice, in
reality, did to them: it imposed inferior status and often inferior education on them in
life.
Id.
87. See, e.g., id. at 147 (observing Catharine MacKinnon's thoughts in her rewrite of Brown
arguing that "[tihe equality injury, hence the violation of law in these cases, thus lies not in the
children's response to the state practice but in the practice itself"); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 51
(praising Drew Days's rewrite of Brown with the following observations: "Whether, or to what
degree, blacks may have been psychically damaged is of no constitutional moment. The injury
was the act, or even the attempt, to damage black children's status as citizens.").
88. See generally Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121, 134 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (discussing
impact of Supreme Court's movement away from a victim's perspective to a perspective focused
on the intent of perpetrators of discriminatory acts).
89. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240-51 (1991) (discussing the dissolution
of desegregation decrees and its impact on schools in light of resegregation trends).
90. Linda Greene, From Brown to Grutter, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 17 (2004). See generally
Freeman, supra note 88, at 134 (discussing Supreme Court's movement towards a perspective
that focuses on the intent of perpetrators of discriminatory acts).
91. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that state, local officials,
and the Board played a role "in creating self-perpetuating patterns of residential segregation").
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identifiable. 92 Accordingly, from Marshall's vantage point, it-was not
the Brown Court's focus on injury to victims that retarded the
development of equal-protection law; instead, subsequent shortcomings
in this area of law were attributable to the Court's movement away from
93
a victim's perspective.
Admittedly, with regard to Brown's legacy in the area of school
desegregation, there is plenty of room for legitimate dissatisfaction.
W.E.B. Du Bois once opined: "[T]heoretically the Negro needs neither
94
segregated schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is Education."
Brown is a disappointment if its impact is measured in terms of the
extent of school desegregation in the America of the early twenty-first
century. Quite arguably, Brown is an even greater failure if its impact is
measured in terms of the quality of the education being received by
most children of color in this country today. 95 Frustratingly, school
desegregation came about slowly. 96 And, when some progress was
finally being made, the country's schools began resegregating in ways
that were beyond constitutional reach.97 The Supreme Court itself must
bear some responsibility for these developments. 98 In 1955, the Court
followed its initial opinion in Brown with a second opinion, popularly
known as Brown H. 99 In Brown H, the Court crafted perhaps the most
unfortunate oxymoron in the history of our judiciary: Desegregation, it
said, was to proceed with "all deliberate speed."' l Brown H's choice of
92. Cf. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 197 (describing exchange between Justice Marshall and
Solicitor General Kenneth Starr during Dowell oral arguments).
93. Cf Freeman, supra note 88, at 134 (discussing implications of a victim's versus a
perpetrator's approach).
94. W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335
(1935).
95. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Court's Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2003). Noting that:
As Professor Orfield documents, to a very large degree, education in the United States
is racially segregated. By any measure, predominantly minority schools are not equal
in their resources or their quality. Wealthy suburban school districts are almost
exclusively white; poor inner city schools are often exclusively comprised of AfricanAmerican and Hispanic students.
Id. For a citation to one of Professor Orfield's recent studies, see infra note 102.
96. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 204 (noting that "[tlen years after the Brown
decision, only 1.2 percent of black students in the South attended schools with whites");
PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 113 (noting similar numbers).
97. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 212-13 (noting that Supreme Court decisions, white
flight, housing segregation, and other factors have contributed to the trend toward the
resegregation of schools).
98. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95, passim (developing the argument that two major sets
of Supreme Court cases have contributed to the resegregation of the nation's schools).
99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 294 (1955).
100. Id. at 301. See WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 49, at 213 (Cass Sunstein
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words was viewed by many Southern school boards as an open-ended
invitation to resist, stall and delay-and resist, stall, and delay they
did.101 As a result, school desegregation proceeded glacially in the
decade after Brown. In 1964, ninety-eight percent of African-American
10 2
school children in the South still attended schools that were all-black.
James Patterson noted: "Virtually all southern black children who had
entered the first grade in 1954 and who remained in southern schools
graduated from all-black schools twelve years later." 10 3 Even in 1968,
over seventy-seven percent of southern black children attended schools
that were overwhelmingly populated by fellow students of color. 104 It
was not until the Supreme Court decided cases such as Green v. New
Kent County, 10 5 Alexander v. Holmes County106 and Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education10 7 in the late 1960s and
early 1970s that federal courts began aggressively pushing school
districts, including some Northern districts, to desegregate. 108 As a
consequence, integration statistics began to improve dramatically. By
1988, only twenty-four percent of the black school children in the South
attended intensely segregated schools (i.e., schools that were ninety
percent or more minorities). 10 9 At that time, the progress being made in
the South was considerably better than the progress being made in the
rest of the country. In the Northeast, for example, forty-eight percent of
black children attended schools that were ninety percent or more
minority in 1988,110 whereas 41.8% of African-American public
students in the Midwest were then attending intensely segregated
schools. 111 Reflecting an erosion of the national commitment to
quoting Justice Marshall in 1980s as saying, "After all these years, I've finally figured out what
,all deliberate speed' really means. S-l-o-w.")
101. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 86-113 (discussing Southern resistance to
desegregation).
102. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE? 17 (Harvard Civil Rights Project, Jan. 2004).
103. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 113.
104. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 102, at 20 tbl.8 (observing that in 1968, 77.8% of black
students in the South attended a school that was 90-100% minority, while 80.9% attended a
school that was 50-100% minority).
105. Green v. County Sch. Rd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
106. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
107. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
108. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 102, at 17-18 (noting that in these three decisions, "the
Supreme Court decided that desegregation must be thorough, comprehensive, [and] immediate");
PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 185 (noting desegregation statistics).
109. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 102, at 20 tbl.8.
110. See id. at 20 tbl.8 (observing the trends of black students in minority schools throughout
various regions in the United States).
111. Id.
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desegregation, the percentage of black students attending heavily
segregated schools has risen since 1988.112 By 2001, thirty-one percent
of Southern black children attended intensely segregated schools, while
51.2% and 46.8% of their Northern and Midwestern counterparts,
respectively, attended schools in which ninety percent or more of the
pupils were students of color. 113 In fact, about seventy percent of all
African-Americans attending public schools in 2001 were at schools in
which minority students constituted a majority of the student body.114
Impacting these statistics is a trend that saw many schools, which
were formerly all-white, go through a period in which they were
meaningfully integrated only to end up virtually all-black.11 5 This
resegregation of schools is troubling for proponents of integration not
because, as Justice Thomas has argued, integrationists are driven by the
fallacy that a black child needs to sit next to a white child in order to
learn. 116 Rather, as demonstrated in a report by the Harvard Civil
Rights Project, there is a persistent correlation between concentrations
of poverty and the degree to which students of color are segregated in
public schools.' 17 In a perfect world one might expect that schools with
the highest concentrations of poor students would receive the greatest
infusion of resources. 118 It is not unusual for the opposite to be the case
112. See id. (observing that in all five geographic regions of the United States, the percentage
of black students in minority schools has increased from 1988 to 2001).
113. Id. Except for Michigan, the State of Illinois at sixty-one percent had the nation's
highest concentration of black students attending intensely segregated schools in 2001-02. Id. at
27 tbl. 11. Michigan had 62.7%. Id.
114. See id. at 19 tbl.7 (noting that in 2001, 30.2% of students in white majority schools were
black).
115. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, Unequal Education, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22-29,
2004, at 68 (describing resegregation of schools in Washington, D.C.); Dahleen Glanton, South
Sees Integration Slip Into Past: From White to Mixed to Black, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 2004, at I
(describing a pattern of resegregation in a suburban-Atlanta school district); Celeste Smith, When
Busing Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 4A-30 (describing how a school in the Charlotte
public school system is coping with resegregation).
116. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (challenging the notion that black schools are
inherently inferior and stating that blacks do not need to be in schools with white children to
succeed).
117. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 102, at 21-22.
118. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 217 (explaining that "[b]lack children.., are more
likely than white children to bring severe academic and behavioral problems with them to the first
grade, [and that] pupils such as these need more than equality of resources"); James E. Ryan,
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 285 (1999) (stating "[g]reater needs require
greater resources: Disadvantaged students simply cost more to educate, requiring additional
educational programs and non-academic services such as health care and counseling"); Ellis
Cose, Brown v. Board: A Dream Deferred, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, at 54 (detailing that sixtyone percent of whites, eighty-one percent of Hispanics and ninety-three percent of blacks believe
that schools should be funded at "whatever level it takes to raise minority-student achievement to
an acceptable national standard").
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in the America of the early twenty-first century. All too often, the
schools whose students have the greatest need receive the least
support. 119 In many instances, therefore, schools in this country remain
essentially separate and unequal. 120 Large numbers of poor black and
Latino school children find themselves disproportionately relegated to
schools that are poorly funded and ill supported, while many of their
white peers attend either private schools or well-funded suburban public
schools in wealthier communities. 12 1 The disparity in the funding
received by school districts within the same state is, in some cases,
mind-boggling. 122 In Illinois, for example, one mostly white school
district in Chicago's affluent northern suburbs spends more than
in Chicago's
$13,000 per student, while one mostly black school district
123
student.
per
$7,000
than
less
spends
suburbs
southern
VI.

BROWN I: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
AND BRIDGING THE EDUCATIONAL GAP

To their credit, some litigants in recent years have preserved the spirit
of Brown by seeking declarations that disparities in funding among
school districts within a particular state violate the state's
constitution. 124 While lawsuits have been successful in states such as
New York, 125 the Illinois Supreme Court refused to recognize that
119. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 1610-11, 1614-15 (describing substantial
disparities in school funding and concluding that "American public education is characterized by
wealthy white suburban schools spending a great deal on education surrounding much poorer
African-American city schools that spend much less on education"); Cohen, supra note 10, at 4A24 (observing that because resources of schools are often tied to their tax base, suburban schools
have more resources than schools in poorer areas); Diane Rado, et al., Still Separate, Unequal,
CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2004, at 1, 14-15 (describing under-funding of minority schools in Illinois).
120. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 95, passim (describing the trend toward resegregation
and the Supreme Court cases contributing to the pattern); Cohen, supra note 10, at 4A-24 (noting
the resegregation trend); Rado, et al., supra note 119, at I (describing what one academic calls
"educational apartheid in Illinois").
121. See, e.g., Cose, supra note 118, at 54 (noting that only thirty-eight percent of blacks
believe their "schools have the resources necessary to provide a quality education"); Rado, et al.,
supra note 119, at 14-15 (describing racial disparities in Illinois public schools).
122. See, e.g., Rado, et al., supra note 119, at 14 (detailing disparities between funding of
Illinois school districts).
123. See id. (discussing that in Northbrook School District 27 (85.5% white), spending is
$13,446 per student, while in Dolton School District 149 (nearly 100% black), spending is $6,977
per student).
124. See generally Paul J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis,
63 ALB. L. REV. 1101 (2000); Cohen, supra note 10, at 4A-24. But see Ryan, supra note 118, at
293 (contending "evidence indicates that increasing expenditures in racially and
socioeconomically isolated schools has not in the past been a very effective strategy for assisting
students" in part because resources may not have been "spent wisely").
125. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349-50 (N.Y. 2003)
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school children have a judicially enforceable right to a quality education
under the Illinois Constitution.126 The need to resort to arguments based
on state constitutions arose because of two key rulings by the United
States Supreme Court.127 In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,128 the Supreme Court declined to recognize wealth as a
suspect class for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, thus leaving intact the stark difference in the meager
resources available to schools in the district attended by Mr.
Rodriguez's children and the relatively plentiful funding given to
schools in affluent adjoining school districts. 129 Further exasperating
proponents of integration, the Supreme Court ruled in Milliken v.
Bradley130 that desegregation decrees could only reach beyond the
limits of an inner-city school district into the suburbs when it could be
shown that the geographic boundaries separating school districts were
themselves the product of intentional discrimination. 13 1 In many
instances, the Rodriguez and Milliken decisions have had the effect of
cordoning off wealthier suburban school districts as safe havens for
white flight, thereby exacerbating the disparity between the quality of
32
the education received by the haves and the have-nots in our society. 1
Predictably, since they are disproportionately educated in poorer
schools, on average students of color do not perform as well on
standardized tests as whites. 133 The gap in test scores persists to a lesser
degree even when African-American and Latino children attend the
same schools as white students. 134 In these cases, however, the test(holding that the school finance system violated the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution).
126. See Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ill. 1999) (holding that despite the
education clause of Illinois Constitution, "questions relating to the quality of a public school
education are for the legislature, not the courts, to decide").
127. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
128. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
129. See id. at 23-24 (discussing income levels of parents, resources available to schools, and
education discrepancies).
130. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717.
131. See id. at 744-45 (addressing the difficulty of implementing remedies for the problems
plaguing schools with regard to recent racial segregation).
132. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 207, 238 (discussing current resegregation
trends); PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 198 (highlighting Supreme Court cases regarding school
policy decisions and the recent problem of resegregation); Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 160215 (discussing 1970s Supreme Court decisions, including Rodriguez and Milliken, and their
contribution to resegregation and inequality in American public education).
133. COTrROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 239; PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 214-15; Barnes,
supra note 115, at 68-69.
134. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 214-15 (discussing the relation between race and test
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score differential may be attributable, at least in part, to practices like
academic tracking that sometimes end up segregating students along
racial lines in the classrooms of supposedly "integrated" schools.' 35 All
too often, students of color are disproportionately under-represented in
the honors classrooms of our public schools, while they are overrepresented in special education and remedial courses. 136 Finding ways
to close the racial gap in test scores is particularly important in light of
the Supreme Court's ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger.137 Delivering the
majority opinion of the Court in Grutter, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
upheld the use of affirmative action in university admissions with a
caveat: She hopes that in twenty-five years the playing field will have
leveled to the point that it will no longer be necessary to take an
applicant's race into account. 138 If the disparity between black and
white test scores is to be bridged in this relatively short period of time,
we must make a serious commitment at the national level to ensure that
each child is given a fair chance to obtain a quality education. 3 9 Such a
commitment would demand an outlay of resources far beyond those
presently allocated for public schools by the No Child Left Behind
Act. 140 There is currently serious concern and debate over the proper
use of tests to gauge student achievement across the country. 14 1 The
scores, and illustrating that social class and parental educational levels do not fully explain gaps
in test scores).
135. See Molly McDonough, Making Brown Real, A.B.A. J., April 2004, at 50 (showing that
black students are greatly underrepresented in honors programs, but are overly represented in
discipline and special education).
136. See id. (stating that while blacks are one-third of the population of a North Carolina high
school, only three of 252 black students are in honors courses, and that blacks constitute fifty-six
percent of children identified as learning disabled).
137. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that a law school may implement an
admissions program tailored to obtain a diverse student body).
138. Id. at 343.
139. In order to foster the requisite national commitment to education, Congressman Jesse
Jackson, Jr. proposes the adoption of a Constitutional amendment granting each child the right to
"a public education of equal high quality." See JESSE L. JACKSON, JR. & FRANK E. WATKINS, A
MORE PERFECT UNION: ADVANCING NEW AMERICAN RIGHTS 330-49 (2001) (proposing a
constitutional amendment to combat disparities in education).
140. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000 & West Supp. 2004). See Derrick Z. Jackson, 50 years later:
Money for war, rhetoricfor kids, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 2004, at 21.
The Center for Budget Priorities, a Washington think tank .... released a report that
concluded that funding of [the] No Child Left Behind [Act] has in four years fallen $32
billion below what Congress authorized... [and that] "this is a conservative estimate
because it is unclear how much it will cost states and localities to meet all the new
mandates in this law."
Id.
141. See, e.g., PATrERSON, supra note 12, at 214-16 (describing racial gaps in test scores and
discussing debate over whether gap is partly attributable to "flaws in the tests"); KLUGER, supra
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extent to which we are willing to make the investments needed to
rectify a system that still consigns far too many school children of color
to separate-and-unequal educations will be the ultimate test-a test of
the type of society in which we live.
VII. CONCLUSION

Despite the inequities I have just described, I decline to join those
who have taken the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary to lay problems
we are having today at the feet of the Brown decision itself.14 2 I believe
that the key to an appreciation of the special role Brown plays in our
culture can be found in the passage in which the Court emphasized the
need to look at all factors-tangible and intangible-in determining
whether black school children were being denied equal protection of the
laws. In support of this approach, the Court referred to its prior
decisions in Sweatt v. Painter143 and McLaurin v. Okahoma:144
In Sweatt v. Painter.... in finding that a segregated law school for
Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this
Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school."
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.... the Court, in requiring
that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all
other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". .. his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."1 45
With regard to assessing the value of Brown, we need to engage in a
similar exercise. If we limit our focus to objective measures of matters
such as the degree to which the public schools of this country are
meaningfully integrated, Brown admittedly falls woefully short. 146 It is
when we shift our focus to include broader, "intangible" considerations
that we discover "what makes for greatness" in a legal opinion.
Brown's revolutionary approach to the Equal Protection Clause of the
note 7, at 785-86 (describing the racial gap in test scores and the debate within the black
community whether standardized tests "fairly measure the totality of black intelligence and
cultural strength").
142. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 38, at 10 ("Brown v. Board of Education was a dramatic
instance of a remedy that promised to correct deficiencies in justice far deeper than the Supreme
Court was able to understand"); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 49 ("Any benefits... derived from
the Brown holding must be measured against its premises-the vocabulary of black inferiority.
For all of Brown's victories, we are left to ask: at what cost? My view is that the Court and the
litigants made the wrong choice.")
143. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
144. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
145. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
146. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
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Constitution quickly expanded beyond public schools to reach statesponsored discrimination in other venues. 147 In addition, Brown laid the
moral and legal foundation of the civil rights laws that provide shelters
of equality for people of color in this country, as well as for women,
ethnic, and religious minorities, the physically challenged, those over
forty, and increasingly, gays and lesbians. I would go so far as to say
that, together with the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution
itself, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I
Have a Dream" speech, the Brown decision is among the pantheon of
essential writings that are fairly to be regarded as defining the essence
of the American spirit.
A quotation in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar comes to mind. At one
point a question arises whether higher powers are at fault for the
problems faced by Romans. And the response is: "The fault ...lies not
in our stars, but in ourselves that we are underlings."' 148 To the extent
we have some reservations, and some disappointments, regarding where
we stand fifty years after Brown, the fault lies not with the stars. It does
not lie in the firmament, the judicial heavens in which Brown now
shines so brightly. 149 Rather the fault is with us, the subsequent
generations who have failed to follow the path lit by Brown. The fault
lies not with Brown, but with ourselves, that we are not yet the society
we aspire to be.

147. See COTTROL ET AL., supra note 22, at 240-43 (discussing Brown's legal implications
and the changes that have been made in race relations because African-Americans were willing to
challenge the entrenched system of racism); see, e.g., Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717
(C.D. Ala. 1956) (finding unconstitutional discrimination on buses), aff'd 352 U.S. 903 (1956);
Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955) (banning discrimination on
public beaches), affd 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(outlawing discrimination on public golf courses).
148. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc. 2. Norman Amaker used this
quotation in a footnote to the remarks he delivered at Southern Illinois University in
commemoration of Brown's fortieth anniversary; see Amaker, supra note 37, at 12. In the text
associated with his footnote, Professor Amaker suggests that the "problem the critics, like
Wechsler, have is not in the opinion but rather seems to lie elsewhere." I thought it appropriate
on the occasion of Brown's fiftieth anniversary to elaborate on the nature of that "elsewhere"
identified by Professor Amaker.
149. See Waldo E. Martin, Jr., Preface to BROWN V. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT (Leon Friedman ed., 2004), at xvi ("[T]he tendency to
equate the Brown decision with the whole of the history of integration, notably school integration,
is flawed and misleading. In and of itself, that decision is neither responsible for the too-few
subsequent moments of integration's success nor the too-many subsequent moments of
integration's failure.").

